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I.   INTRODUCTION  
 The relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion is 
a historically significant one. The Court’s institutional differences 
from the other two branches of government place it in a unique posi-
tion when it comes to the importance of public support and approval. 
On one hand, the Justices are unelected, serve life terms, and are gen-
erally unanswerable to the public.1 The Court also lacks the power to 
enforce its own decisions.2 In theory, these aspects insulate it from 
public pressure. Thus, because the Court is not electorally accounta-
ble, societal influences and public opinion should play little role in its 
decisionmaking. However, the opposite seems to be the case. 3 The 
                                                                                                                       
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law (2017). First, I would like to thank 
Professor Tahirih V. Lee for immediately recognizing the potential in me before I could see 
it in myself. I truly cannot thank you enough for your continued guidance and encourage-
ment, as I might not be where I am today without it. I would also like to thank all of my 
friends, family, and classmates who supported me throughout this process. Finally, thank 
you Florida State University Law Review for making all of this possible.  
 1. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of 
Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 184 (2013).   
 2. Id.  
 3. See id. (“[S]cholars and commentators agree that it is crucial for the Court to main-
tain a reputation from the public as impartial, trustworthy, and above the politics and bar-
gaining characterizing Congress and the presidency.”). 
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Court’s institutional differences from the other branches of govern-
ment are exactly why public opinion is so important in retaining its le-
gitimacy and more importantly, its functionality as an institution.4  
 The question that has dominated legal and political science dis-
course for the past decade is, to what extent can and do courts “make 
policy decisions by going outside established ‘legal’ criteria found in 
precedent, statute, and constitution[?]”5 This is where the Court’s re-
liance on ‘non-legal’ principles, such as ideological preferences and 
public opinion, come into the analysis. The first step in establishing a 
relationship between the Court’s decisionmaking and public influence 
is to understand the relationship between the Court and public opinion 
itself. Again, institutional capacities, or lack thereof, are the driving 
force behind the Court’s need for public approval. It may even be said 
that the Court’s decisions will only have their full effects when popular 
opinion supports them.6 Thus, considering the Court strictly “a legal 
institution is to underestimate its significance in the American politi-
cal system.”7 It is also a political institution in that it issues decisions 
on controversial questions of national policy.8  
 Often times, Supreme Court constitutional interpretation “can in-
tersect social reform movements at various points in their evolution.”9 
Less frequently, however, the Court issues a landmark decision that 
would have been constitutionally inconceivable just a decade or two 
earlier. While “[s]ocial and political change can render previously in-
conceivable Court decisions conceivable. . . . such change does not nec-
essarily make those rulings inevitable.”10 Multiple factors, such as le-
gal precedent, historical background, ideological preferences, and pub-
lic opinion, affect judicial decisionmaking too. This Note is not the first, 
nor will it be the last, to analyze the complex multitude of reasons be-
hind Supreme Court decisionmaking, particularly for the presence of 
‘non-legal’ influences.  
 My job today is to explore the connection between public opinion, 
societal progress, and Supreme Court decisionmaking. Specifically, 
                                                                                                                       
 4. Neil Malhotra & Stephen A. Jessee, Ideological Proximity and Support for the Su-
preme Court, 36 POL. BEHAV. 817, 818 (2013).  
 5. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-80 (1957). 
 6. Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New 
Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1023 
(2004).  
 7. Dahl, supra note 5, at 279.   
 8. Id.  
 9. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, at ix (2013). 
 10. Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 135 (2013). 
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and unlike anyone else, my focus is on the journey to legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage, which has undoubtedly been one of the most 
socially, politically, and legally contentious issues in the United States. 
The dramatic changes in social and political attitudes about both gay 
rights generally and same-sex marriage over the past three decades are 
truly remarkable. For that reason, same-sex marriage makes for a com-
pelling test subject when looking at the relationship between public 
opinion and judicial decisionmaking. Ultimately, I find that the attitu-
dinal model best explains the outcomes of the same-sex marriage cases, 
and the attitudinal change model provides a more complete explanation 
for how and why the Court progressed from its Bowers11 decision in 
1986 to the monumental Obergefell12 decision in 2015. 
 Part II of this Note discusses four behavioral models that have 
guided scholars’ approach to analyzing and empirically studying judi-
cial decisionmaking. The legal model is based on a formalist view of 
the law, which calls for legal analysis through strict adherence to com-
mon law precedents or statutory texts and is devoid of any expression 
of judicial ideology.13 The attitudinal model assumed prominence in Jef-
frey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth’s The Supreme Court and the Atti-
tudinal Model.14 This model is based on the simple theory that “judges 
make result-oriented decisions, based primarily upon their ideologies.”15 
The attitudinal change model suggests that external social and political 
forces, rather than internal forces (e.g., ideology), influence deci-
sionmaking based on the hypothesis that judges are influenced by the 
same social forces that sway public opinion.16 Finally, the strategic be-
havior model is based on rational choice institutionalism, which 
emerged when Lee Epstein and Jack Knight empirically assessed Wal-
ter F. Murphy’s argument in The Elements of Judicial Strategy.17  
 Part III is a historical account of the gay rights movement in the 
United States. It lays out a same-sex marriage timeline, tracking the 
gradual change in public opinion that paralleled Supreme Court pro-
gress. Finally, Part IV chooses the attitudinal model and the attitudi-
nal change model, to create what I term the “attitudinal model ‘plus’ ” 
                                                                                                                       
 11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 13. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 254-55 (1997). 
 14. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Glendon Schubert, David Rohde, and Harold Spaeth developed 
the attitudinal model. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED]. 
 15. Cross, supra note 13, at 266.  
 16. Isaac Unah et al., U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL. 
293, 300 (2015).   
 17. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).  
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as the best explanation of the Court’s decisionmaking in the same-sex 
marriage cases. Further, it demonstrates how the same social forces 
that influenced the gradual public approval of same-sex marriage, sim-
ilarly influenced the Court overtime.  
II.   THEORETICAL MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
 Several theoretical models seek to explain judicial decisionmaking. 
There are three main models of judicial behavior generally depicted in 
scholarship: legal, attitudinal, and strategic. 18  Each of the models 
stand for different hypotheses on how judges make decisions. Specifi-
cally, I will explore four models, the legal model; the attitudinal model; 
the attitudinal change model; and the strategic behavior model, detail-
ing their diverse contributions to the scholarship on judicial behavior. 
In Part IV, I will come back to these models in light of the same-sex 
marriage timeline and cases described in Part III to draw a conclusion.  
A.   Legal Model 
 The legal model is a traditional, formalist theory that portrays the 
judge “as one who objectively and impersonally decides cases by logi-
cally deducing the correct resolution from a definite and consistent 
body of legal rules.”19 This model demands that judicial decisionmak-
ing be objective and impartial.20 Further, it calls for pure legal reason-
ing, devoid of any expression of judicial individuality or ideology.21 It 
hypothesizes that judges only want to interpret the law and thus, 
“choose between alternative case outcomes and doctrinal positions on 
the basis of their legal merits.” 22  Thus, “judge[s do] not make  
law . . . [but simply] appl[y] the law that [was] created by the legisla-
ture or [is] inherent in the common law.”23 This model reflects the tra-
ditional view that law and politics should and do remain separate.  
 However, since the legal realist movement, scholars no longer fully 
accept the legal model’s explanation of judicial behavior.24 The legal 
                                                                                                                       
 18. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 5 (2006). 
 19. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal 
Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 87 
(1995) (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 24-25 
(1960); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-75 (1973)).   
 20. Id.  
 21. Cross, supra note 13, at 255.  
 22. BAUM, supra note 18, at 5.  
 23. Hasnas, supra note 19, at 87.  
 24. BAUM, supra note 18, at 8.  
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model has largely been abandoned and disproven in recent years.25 In-
stead, a complex multitude of factors, including legal, ideological, and 
strategic elements are suggested to drive judicial decisionmaking. 26 
Strict reliance on precedent without any ideological principles coming 
into play may no longer be a realistic assessment of judicial deci-
sionmaking, and “legal scholars have implicitly accepted the use of prec-
edent at face value.”27 More cynically, adherence to the legal model “may 
simply be a convenient fiction for judges, lawyers, professors, and oth-
ers.”28 Although the legal model may no longer accurately reflect the 
prevailing view of scholars, judicial decisionmaking is also not exclu-
sively result-oriented, as the reliance on precedent, statute, and consti-
tution still pervades and restrains the vast majority of legal writing. 
B.   Attitudinal Model  
 “The attitudinal model is [perhaps] the bedrock theoretical princi-
ple of legal realists” and one of the leading theories when it comes to 
explaining judicial decisionmaking.29 This theory, advanced by Jeffrey 
A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, materialized in the legal realist move-
ment of the 1920’s, which was led by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome 
Frank, among others. 30  The legal realist movement challenged the 
classical view of legal formalism. As described above, the premise of 
the legal model was inspired by legal formalism and posited that a 
“judge’s techniques were socially neutral, his private views  
irrelevant . . . [and that] judging was more like finding than making, 
a matter of necessity rather than choice.”31 Legal realists rejected the 
theory that judges do not make law because judging inherently creates 
law.32 According to Jerome Frank:  
 Even in a relatively static society, men have never been able to con-
struct a comprehensive, externalized set of rules anticipating all possi-
ble legal disputes and settling them in advance. Even in such a social 
order no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations 
of events; situations are bound to occur which were never contemplated 
                                                                                                                       
 25. Cross, supra note 13, at 255 (“The formalist [legal] model held sway for a long time, but 
most contemporary scholars no longer adhere to the strict determinate formalist [legal] model.”).  
 26. Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into May-
onnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 72 (2014).  
 27. Cross, supra note 13, at 260. 
 28. Id. at 263.  
 29. Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case 
Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 L. & POL’Y 295, 296 (2006).    
 30. SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 86-87.  
 31. Id. (citing Yosal Rogat, Legal Realism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 420 
(Paul Edwards, ed., 1972)).  
 32. Id. at 87.  
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when the original rules were made. How much less is such a frozen 
legal system possible in modern times. . . . Our society would be 
straight-jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of law-
yers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of 
ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions.33 
Thus, legal realism is where “[t]he attitudinal model ha[d] its genesis,” 
but the model also incorporates key concepts from psychology, political 
science, and economics.34  
 The simple hypothesis of the attitudinal model is that judges come 
to the court “with their ideological preferences fully formed and, in 
light of contextual case facts, these preferences cast overwhelming in-
fluence on their decision making.”35 Accordingly, judicial decisionmak-
ing is result-oriented here because it is based primarily on the judge’s 
ideologies.36 More specifically, the attitudinal model suggests Supreme 
Court Justices have more power to freely implement their personal 
policy preferences than other judges.37 The Justices have life-tenured 
positions, no electoral accountability, and comprise a court of last re-
sort that controls its own docket, giving them enormous power to let 
their own ideologies influence decisionmaking.38  
 However, there are “[t]wo fundamental assumptions [that] underlie 
the . . . attitudinal model”: (1) “individual attitudes are assumed to be 
the primary determinants of behavior (i.e., decisions)” and (2) “individ-
ual attitudes are considered fundamental and enduring.”39 Thus, “Jus-
tices vote the way they do . . . because this is who they are and who 
they are likely to remain.”40 Based on this model, each Justice’s vote is 
determined solely by his or her ideology. For example, “Rehnquist 
vote[d] the way he [did] because he is extremely conservative; Mar-
shall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.”41 Moreover, 
the attitudinal model assumes the Justices have fixed ideological pref-
erences that are enduring throughout their time on the bench.42 While 
                                                                                                                       
 33. Id. at 88 (citing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 5-7 (1949)).  
 34. Id. at 87.  
 35. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 296 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 14).  
 36. Cross, supra note 13, at 266.  
 37. SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 110.  
 38. SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14, at 92. 
 39. William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 171 (1996).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Lee Epstein et al., Review Essays, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Pol-
icymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 587-88 (2001).  
 42. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 39, at 171. 
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this might be a slight oversimplification for explaining judicial behav-
ior, the attitudinal model has been widely tested under various condi-
tions, with strong evidence supporting it.43  
C.   Attitudinal Change Model 
 Although they share a common name, the attitudinal model and the 
attitudinal change model do have significant differences. While the at-
titudinal model suggests internal forces (such as a judge’s ideological 
preferences and values) influence vote choice, the attitudinal change 
model suggests external social and political forces influence deci-
sionmaking.44 More specifically, the attitudinal change model rests on 
the idea that judges are “influenced by the same social forces that sway 
public opinion” rather than being influenced directly by public opin-
ion.45 Because judges are still members of society, social forces influ-
ence their beliefs in the same way they influence the rest of the  
American public.46 
 The sentiment of the attitudinal change model has not only been 
advanced by scholars, but by Supreme Court Justices themselves. Ad-
dressing the question of whether “judges [are] influenced by public 
opinion,” former Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “I think it would be 
very wrong to say that judges are not influenced by public opinion. 
Indeed, I think it is all but impossible to conceive of judges who are in 
any respect normal human beings who are not affected by public opin-
ion in this way.”47 He further explained the effect of public opinion, 
specifically in regards to the salient constitutional questions:  
“Great” constitutional cases often derive their “greatness” from the 
very fact that they involve broad jurisprudential themes, rather 
than simply the nuts and bolts of the law, and are therefore more 
likely to be affected by tides of public opinion already running in the 
country. Secondly, important constitutional litigation can generate 
its own tides of public opinion, just as a large ship causes a consid-
erable wake, and these more immediate tides may also affect the 
decision of the case.48 
Chief Justice Rehnquist championed the attitudinal change model’s 
theory that the nexus between public opinion and judicial deci-
sionmaking “arises from the force of mutually experienced events 
                                                                                                                       
 43. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 296-97.  
 44. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 300 n.28.  
 45. Id. at 300.  
 46. Id.  
 47. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 751, 752 (1986).  
 48. Id. at 768.  
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and ideas in shaping and reshaping the preferences of both the  
public and the [J]ustices.”49  
D.   Strategic Behavior Model 
 The strategic behavior model is another popular theory advanced 
in judicial decisionmaking scholarship. The theory postulates that the 
Supreme Court “directly and deliberately follows public opinion for 
fear of losing its legitimacy as an institution.”50 This model is rooted in 
the belief that the Justices modify their behavior to strategically align 
with public opinion to protect the Court’s legitimacy and promote pol-
icy effectiveness.51 Public opinion serves as an active constraint on the 
Justices’ preferences here. 52  Because the Court does not have the 
power to enforce its own decisions, “it cannot stray too far from public 
opinion.”53 Thus, the Court would risk losing both the public’s confi-
dence and its institutional legitimacy if it consistently voted contrary 
to public opinion.54   
 Much like the attitudinal change model, the sentiment of the stra-
tegic behavior model has also been echoed among Supreme Court Jus-
tices. Most notably, Justice Frankfurter spoke out in regard to the 
Court maintaining societal acceptance. He stated, “[t]o a large  
extent, . . . the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional inter-
pretation of words whose contents are derived from the disposition of 
the Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling thing, 
the general drift of public opinion.”55 He reiterated this notion in his 
dissent in Baker v. Carr, stating, “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed 
of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained pub-
lic confidence in its moral sanction.” 56  In another landmark case, 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice O’Connor similarly reasoned, 
                                                                                                                       
 49. Michael W. Giles et al., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling 
the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 295 
(2008); see also Rehnquist, supra note 47, at 768-69 (“This is not a case of judges ‘knuckling 
under’ to public opinion, and cravenly abandoning their oaths of office. Judges . . . can no 
more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at 
other jobs. In addition, if a judge on coming to the bench were to decide to seal himself off 
hermetically from all manifestations of public opinion, he would accomplish very little; he 
would not be influenced by current public opinion, but instead would be influenced by the 
state of public opinion at the time he came to the bench.”). 
 50. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 299.  
 51. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Malhotra & Jessee, supra note 4, at 820.  
 54. Unah et al., supra note 16, at 299.  
 55. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 6, at 1022 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAW AND 
POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1939, 197 (eds. Archibald Mac-
Leish and E. F. Prichard, Jr., 1939). 
 56. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962).  
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“[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance 
and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judi-
ciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare 
what it demands.”57 While the Court is not electorally accountable, it 
is nonetheless important for the Court to stay somewhat in line with 
public opinion in order to retain its legitimacy. All four of these models 
will provide solid frameworks for analyzing the relationship between 
public opinion and Supreme Court decisionmaking regarding gay 
rights and same-sex marriage, as described in Part III.   
III.   SAME-SEX MARRIAGE TIMELINE: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
COINCIDING CASES 
 Same-sex marriage makes for such a compelling test subject when 
studying the relationship between public opinion and judicial deci-
sionmaking because of the dramatic change in social and political at-
titudes in the past three decades. Striking down a federal statute that 
defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman was 
not constitutionally plausible just twenty years ago.58 Even by the mid-
1990s, not a single country in the world legally recognized same-sex 
marriage.59 The timeline of the gradual public approval of same-sex 
marriage, as analyzed with the coinciding Supreme Court cases on the 
issue, provide a telling story of the relationship between public opinion 
and judicial decisionmaking in this context.  
A.   Burger Court (1969 – 1986): Bowers  
 The recognition of any gay rights, much less the legalization of 
same-sex marriage, was not a topic of serious discussion in the United 
States during the 1960s.60 There was no right to privacy, as every state 
criminalized private, consensual sex between same-sex partners. 61 
Federal, state, and local governments treated alleged homosexuality 
as sufficient grounds for dismissal.62Further, “[h]omosexual acts were 
deemed unprofessional conduct sufficient to deny or revoke a license 
to practice medicine, law, or nursing.”63 In the early 1960s, there were 
                                                                                                                       
 57. 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).  
 58. Klarman, supra note 10, at 155.  
 59. Id. at 130.  
 60. See KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 3-6; Richard Wolf, Timeline: Same-sex Marriage 
Through the Years, USA TODAY (June 26, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2015/06/24/same-sex-marriage-timeline/29173703/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2GGN-W8SU]. 
 61. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 3.   
 62. Id. at 5.  
 63. Id.  
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approximately 3,000 military discharges a year based on alleged homo-
sexuality.64 Because there were serious implications associated with be-
ing publicly identified as gay, gay rights organizations had to be ex-
tremely secretive, thus, limiting the influence they could exercise in so-
ciety.65 Further, a 1969 opinion poll reported that sixty-three percent of 
respondents considered homosexuals “harmful to American life.”66 
 Despite the stagnant progress made during the 1960s, the 1970s 
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of gay activists and gay 
rights organizations.67 From a mere fifty gay rights organizations in 
1969 to eight hundred organizations in 1973, the gay rights movement 
was finally getting a public voice.68 As such, same-sex couples started 
applying for marriage licenses for the first time in 1971 and subse-
quently filing suit when their state refused to recognize their mar-
riages as valid.69 State courts decisively rejected any and all legal ar-
guments made for the recognition of same-sex marriage.70 These cas-
ual dismissals were not shocking because “[c]ourts almost never vindi-
cate constitutional claims that strongly contravene public opinion.”71 
In the 1970s, same-sex marriage had so little support that there were 
no polls that surveyed public opinion on the issue.72  
 By 1985, only twenty-five percent of Americans reported having a 
gay friend, coworker, or relative.73 Further, it was not until 1986 that 
the American Civil Liberties Union formally endorsed same-sex mar-
riage.74 Similarly, in 1986, when the Supreme Court was deciding a 
same-sex sodomy issue in Bowers v. Hardwick,75 Justice Powell dis-
cussed the case with his (gay) law clerk and remarked that he had 
never known a gay person.76 The issue in Bowers was whether the 
Constitution “confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy.”77 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found 
the Georgia statute which criminalized consensual sodomy violated 
Hardwick’s right to privacy protected by the Ninth Amendment and 
                                                                                                                       
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 6.   
 66. Id. at 13.  
 67. Id. at 17.  
 68. Id. at 18. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 20. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Klarman, supra note 10, at 132.  
 74. Id.  
 75. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).   
 76. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 37.  
 77. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.   
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under the “notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the [D]ue [P]ro-
cess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”78  
 The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that there was no fun-
damental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, despite the fact that 
the Georgia statute made no distinction between heterosexual and ho-
mosexual sodomy.79 The majority stated it was unwilling to take an ex-
pansive view of its authority and “discover new fundamental rights im-
bedded in the Due Process Clause.”80 It reasoned that “[t]he Court is 
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution.”81 Finally, the majority stated 
that sodomy laws are grounded in notions of morality “and if all laws 
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”82  
 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority’s “obsessive 
focus on homosexual activity . . . in light of the broad language Georgia 
has used.”83 He reasoned that the issue here involved an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy, which had no bearing on Hardwick’s sexual 
orientation.84 He went even further to say that, “[u]nlike the Court, the 
Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homo-
sexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives may be con-
trolled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of 
those other citizens.”85  
 This decision even came under criticism from some of the main-
stream press. In an article for the Los Angeles Times, John Rechy 
opined that “[n]ot since the Supreme Court declared in the Dred Scott 
case that slavery was legal and blacks were not citizens has there been 
a high court ruling as seeped in prejudice as this one.”86 However, the 
criticism was not unanimous among the nation, as only thirty-three 
percent of Americans supported legalizing sodomy.87 In addition, Bow-
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ers “was decided at the height of public hysteria about the AIDS epi-
demic. . . . [as] almost a majority [of Americans] supported quarantin-
ing AIDS victims.”88 
B.   Rehnquist Court (1986 – 2005): Romer & Lawrence  
 By the time the next gay rights case came to the Supreme Court, 
there were major compositional changes. Only Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Stevens, who decided Bow-
ers, remained on the Court. New to the Court were Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Souter, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The Court’s composi-
tion is of the utmost importance because a single vote switch can dras-
tically change the direction of national policy. At this time, there was 
still not a single country in the world that legalized same-sex mar-
riage.89 However, most economically developed countries started see-
ing a change in the meaning of marriage, specifically that marriage 
“became less about childbearing . . . [and] more about mutual commit-
ment and nurturing happiness.”90 Same-sex couples could just as eas-
ily pursue these objectives of marriage as opposite-sex couples, facili-
tating some support to expand the definition of marriage to include 
same-sex couples.91   
 Significantly, 1996 was a defining year for same-sex marriage pro-
gress. The Supreme Court issued what was the first major win for gay 
right supporters in Romer v. Evans.92 In the early 1990s, several Col-
orado cities “enacted ordinances forbidding discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.”93 In response, Colorado amended their state con-
stitution (“Amendment 2”) both to repeal these ordinances and to “pro-
hibit all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or 
local government designed to protect” the civil rights of gay people.94 
The Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2, holding it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.95  
 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that Amend-
ment 2 “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them pro-
tection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of 
                                                                                                                       
 88. Id. 
 89. See David Masci et al., Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 
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persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is un-
precedented in our jurisprudence.” 96  Further, he noted that a law, 
which makes it more difficult for a single group of citizens than for all 
others to seek assistance from the government, is a denial of equal 
protection “in the most literal sense.”97 Additionally, the Court found 
no legitimate governmental purpose in enacting Amendment 2.98    
 The three dissenters in Romer, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and 
Thomas, criticized the majority’s “heavy reliance upon principles of 
righteousness rather than judicial holdings”99 as having “no founda-
tion in American constitutional law, and barely pretend[ing] to.”100 
Justice Scalia also stated the judiciary, as opposed to the political 
branches, had no business taking a side in “this culture war.”101 This 
would hardly be the last word, or dissent, that Justice Scalia would 
author on the topic. Thus, while Romer “was a narrow decision with 
limited implications,” it was nonetheless a significant victory for the 
gay rights movement.102 
 Just when Romer reflected a win, the Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”)103 stood in resistance to that progress. The two main pur-
poses of DOMA were “to defend the institution of traditional hetero-
sexual marriage. . . . [and] to protect the right of the States to formu-
late their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex 
unions.”104 Governing state choice-of-law cases, DOMA stated:   
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respect-
ing a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as 
a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, 
or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.105  
Thus, states were not “required to give full faith and credit to any law 
or judicial decision of another state recognizing same-sex marriage.”106 
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For the purposes of federal law, DOMA defined marriage solely as the 
union between a man and a woman.107  
 After the Romer decision and President Clinton announced his in-
tentions to sign DOMA, the Washington Post declared, “[s]ame-sex 
marriage has suddenly become the most visible issue in the gay rights 
debate.”108 In 1996, DOMA passed by huge margins in both houses of 
Congress.109 The House passed DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67 and the 
Senate passed it by 85 to 14.110 President Clinton kept a low profile, 
signing DOMA after midnight and without public ceremony.111 Mike 
McCurry, President Clinton’s press secretary, later recalled “[h]is pos-
ture was quite frankly driven by the political realities of an election 
year in 1996.”112   
 By 2000, there was still not a single country in the world that had 
legalized same-sex marriage.113 Although same-sex marriage was still 
an enormously controversial topic, consensual same-sex sodomy no 
longer was.114 Gay rights organizations worked towards the repeal of 
sodomy laws by litigation in state courts and lobbying state legisla-
tures.115 Their efforts paid off: by 2003, only four states still criminal-
ized consensual sodomy and specifically targeted same-sex couples, 
compared to half of the states criminalizing same-sex sodomy at the 
time Bowers was decided in 1986.116 Further, states that did still have 
sodomy laws commonly did not enforce them against consenting adults 
acting in private.117   
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 In March of 2003, the constitutionality of same-sex sodomy laws 
came directly before the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.118 Writ-
ing for the majority once again, Justice Kennedy emphasized that 
Bowers’ holding that there was no fundamental right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy119 needed to be reexamined.120 He stated, “Bowers 
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”121 
Further, its “continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosex-
ual persons.”122 The Court found that the decisions consenting adults 
make in the privacy of their homes “are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and a State’s 
view that same-sex sodomy is immoral is not sufficient grounds to up-
hold a law prohibiting it.123 Nor did the Court find any legitimate state 
interest to justify this invasion of privacy.124  
 As Justice Kennedy noted in his opinion, the foundations of Bowers 
seriously eroded in the seventeen years between when it was decided 
and when Lawrence overruled it. 125  In 1986, fifty-seven percent of 
Americans believed same-sex relations between consenting adults 
should not be legal and only thirty-two percent believed it should be 
legal.126 By 2003, only thirty-five percent of Americans believed same-
sex relations between consenting adults should not be legal and sixty 
percent believed it should be legal.127 Thus, overruling Bowers in Law-
rence was a somewhat easy decision for the Court “in the sense that it 
simply involved translating into constitutional law a social norm that 
already commanded overwhelming popular support.”128  
 Despite the seemingly uncontroversial holding of Lawrence, its un-
deniable connection with same-sex marriage made it a salient issue.129 
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The day after the Court issued its decision, there were nearly fifty sto-
ries on gay marriage in major U.S. newspapers.130 Justice Scalia noted 
this connection in his Lawrence dissent, stating “[t]his case ‘does not 
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the 
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of 
this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, 
this is so.”131 Gay rights activists immediately echoed Scalia’s view of 
Lawrence’s implications, believing that same-sex marriage would be 
next.132 However, support for the legalization of same-sex relations fell 
from sixty percent to fifty percent in the month following the Lawrence 
decision, perhaps because of its connection with same-sex marriage.133 
 Nonetheless, just a few months later in November of 2003, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court ruled that barring same-sex couples “from 
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage” was a vio-
lation of the Massachusetts Constitution.134 The court reasoned that 
“[w]hether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and 
whether and how to establish a family . . . are among the most basic of 
every individual’s liberty and due process rights.”135 Thus, Massachu-
setts “became only the fifth jurisdiction in the world to allow gay mar-
riage. [And] [t]he others—Ontario, British Columbia, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands—had all enacted gay marriage only within the [previous] 
two years.”136  
 Immediately following this decision, several cities began issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, while thirteen states amended 
their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. 137  By 2004, the 
number of newspaper articles reporting on gay marriage was ten times 
higher than what it had been in 2000.138 Further, during the 2004 elec-
tion, forty-one percent of voters viewed same-sex marriage as an im-
portant issue and twenty-four percent reported they would vote only 
for candidates that shared their views on the subject.139 At this time, 
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forty-two percent of Americans supported same-sex marriage legaliza-
tion and fifty-five percent opposed it.140 During the Rehnquist Court 
era, same-sex marriage became solidified as a pressing social issue 
throughout the United States.  
C.   Roberts Court (2005-Present): Windsor, Hollingsworth, & Obergefell 
 Just like the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court era experienced 
several compositional changes. In 2005 and 2006, President Bush ap-
pointed John Roberts to replace the former Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Samuel Alito to replace Justice O’Connor.141 Adding Alito to the 
bench was “expected to tilt the balance of the court to the right on mat-
ters like abortion, affirmative action, and the death penalty . . . [which] 
partisans on each side said the outcome would echo through American 
politics for decades.”142 By 2008, the United States proved to be getting 
more progressive in terms of gay rights. Fifteen states provided health 
care benefits to same-sex partners of public employees, as compared to 
zero states in 1993.143 Twenty states had anti-discrimination laws that 
covered sexual orientation.144 And finally, thirty-two states authorized 
additional punishments for hate crimes motivated by anti-gay senti-
ments.145 Working towards marriage, several states enacted domestic 
partnership or civil union laws.  
 In 2009, support for same-sex marriage among Americans was up 
to forty percent.146 In the same year, President Obama made his first 
Supreme Court appointment, nominating Sonia Sotomayor to replace 
Justice Souter.147 Some conservatives criticized her as being “a liberal 
judicial activist of the first order who thinks her own personal political 
agenda is more important [than] the law as written.”148 Her critics also 
pointed to “a panel discussion at Duke University in 2005, where she 
told students that the federal Court of Appeals is where ‘policy is 
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made.’ ”149 Approximately one year later, President Obama made a sec-
ond appointment, nominating Elena Kagan to replace Justice Ste-
vens.150 Yet again, concerns over judicial activism echoed among con-
servative critics.151 Both of President Obama’s nominations were mon-
umental, as democrats had gone fifteen years without a Supreme 
Court appointment.152 Moreover, compositional changes generally re-
flect the appointing President’s policy preferences, which “shift the ide-
ological composition of the bench to bring it into line with what they 
feel is popular sentiment.”153  
 By 2011, the majority of Americans, fifty-three percent, “believe[d] 
same-sex marriage should be recognized by the law” and given all “the 
same rights as traditional marriage.” 154  Another poll showed that 
Americans “opposed DOMA by [fifty-one] percent to [thirty-four] per-
cent.”155 Thus, in less than two decades, support for same-sex marriage 
nearly doubled from twenty-seven percent approval in 1996 to fifty-
three percent approval in 2011.156 In May of 2013, a national survey 
reported seventy-two percent of Americans thought the legalization of 
same-sex marriage was “inevitable.”157 Interestingly enough, Republi-
cans (seventy-three percent) were just as likely as Democrats (seventy-
two percent) and independents (seventy-four percent) to view the le-
galization of same-sex marriage as inevitable.158   
 Just one month later, the Supreme Court decided two landmark 
cases for same-sex marriage. The first case, United States v. Windsor, 
involved a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA that provided a federal def-
inition of “marriage” and “spouse.”159 Section 3 stated that: 
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus 
and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only 
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who 
is a husband or a wife.160 
This section controlled over 1,000 federal laws that addressed marital 
or spousal status as a matter of federal law.161 Notably, the Executive 
Branch refused to defend DOMA in this case and had stopped defend-
ing its constitutionality in 2011.162 Ultimately, the Court held, in a 5-
4 decision, that DOMA “imposes a disability on the class by refusing 
to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper” and 
thus, was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty protected under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.163  
 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “DOMA’s 
unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accept-
ing state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex 
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal 
recognition of their marriages.”164 He went on to list the inequalities 
DOMA imposes on same-sex couples, such as healthcare benefits, 
bankruptcy protections, and federal financial aid eligibility, by living 
as married according to state law but unmarried according to federal 
law.165 Further, Justice Kennedy stated, “DOMA’s principal effect is to 
identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them une-
qual[,] [and] [t]he principal purpose is to impose inequality.”166 Inter-
estingly enough, Justice Kennedy avoided the question of whether 
there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage in his opinion. 
Windsor set the stage for lower courts to decide that question inde-
pendently, leaving the door open for the questions that were ultimately 
presented in Obergefell.    
 It should come as no surprise that the four dissenters were Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for making law in a case “[w]e 
have no power to decide” by stating, “[t]he Court’s errors on both points 
spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the 
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role of this institution in America.”167 He also “accused Justice Ken-
nedy of writing an opinion ‘deliberately transposable,’ in the near fu-
ture, into a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”168 Jus-
tice Alito echoed a similar but less verbose public policy concern, stat-
ing, “the Constitution simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex 
marriage. . . . [a]ny change on a question so fundamental should be 
made by the people through their elected officials.”169   
 The same day, the Court issued its decision in Hollingsworth v. 
Perry.170 Hollingsworth involved an amendment to the California Con-
stitution, known as Proposition 8, which provided “[o]nly marriage be-
tween a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”171 Cal-
ifornia law allowed same-sex couples to enter into “domestic partner-
ships,” which carried “the same rights, protections, and benefits,  
and . . . [were] subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and 
duties under law” as marriage. 172 Proposition 8 did not take those 
rights away, but “reserve[ed] only ‘the official designation of the term 
“marriage” for the union of opposite-sex couples as a matter of state 
constitutional law.’ ”173  
 The Court declined to address the constitutionality of Proposition 8 
because it found the petitioners lacked Article III standing to invoke 
the power of a federal court.174 Chief Justice Roberts explained there 
was no injury to redress here: “[T]he District Court declared Proposi-
tion 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the state officials named as de-
fendants from enforcing it . . . . and the state officials chose not to ap-
peal.”175 Nor can a private party seek relief for a generalized grievance 
on behalf of the State.176 The Court stated, “[w]e have never before up-
held the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of 
a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline to 
do so for the first time here.”177  
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 By May of 2015, a record high of sixty percent of Americans sup-
ported the legalization of same-sex marriage.178 Roughly one month 
later, the issue of same-sex marriage came before the Court once again 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.179 Thus, in just two years, the Supreme Court 
decided a total of three same-sex marriages cases, as opposed to the 
seventeen years it took to decide Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence, all of 
which involved gay rights issues but not same-sex marriage directly.180  
 Obergefell involved challenges to Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
Tennessee law, all of which defined marriage as a union between one 
man and one woman.181 The question before the Court was whether 
these states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same-sex 
couples “the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully per-
formed in another State, given full recognition.”182 Soon to be known 
as “the Court’s great gay rights champion,” Justice Kennedy once 
again wrote for the five-member majority.183 In a landmark decision, 
the Court held that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent 
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex 
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”184 Thus, just the 
same as opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples have the fundamental 
right to marry in all states.185        
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 The Court reasoned that it has long held the right to marry is fun-
damental under the Due Process Clause.186 Marital status provides an 
expansive list of government rights, responsibilities, and benefits, so 
denying same-sex couples of the same legal recognition afforded to op-
posite-sex couples “would disparage their choices and diminish their 
personhood.”187 Justice Kennedy reasoned the fundamental right to 
marry is both a matter of history and ancient tradition but also rises 
“from a better informed understanding of how constitutional impera-
tives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”188 He went 
on to say that new societal understandings about our most fundamen-
tal institutions (e.g., marriage) could reveal inequality that was once 
unnoticed and unchallenged.189 The history and tradition, namely dis-
cussing marriage in personal terms, is much different than the history 
and tradition Justice Kennedy relied on in Windsor. Justice Kennedy 
discusses what marriage means to individuals, whereas his discussion 
of history and tradition in Windsor revolved around federalism and the 
rights of states to define marriage themselves.  
 This decision did not come without fierce dissents from the same four 
Justices that dissented in Windsor:190 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. Further, both Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas dissented in Lawrence in 2003 and Romer in 1996.191 The dis-
sents mainly criticized the majority’s decision for being “an act of will” 
based on “arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fair-
ness” rather than legal arguments or judgment.192 Justice Scalia rea-
soned that “[j]udges are selected precisely for their skill as lawyers; 
whether they reflect the policy views of a particular constituency is not 
(or should not be) relevant.”193 He referred to the Court as “a select, pa-
trician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine” and criticized the Court 
for “violat[ing] a principle even more fundamental than no taxation with-
out representation: no social transformation without representation.”194  
 Chief Justice Roberts made similar arguments, criticizing the ma-
jority’s envisioned role of the Court as “anything but humble or re-
strained” because “[o]ver and over, the majority exalts the role of the 
judiciary in delivering social change.”195 He reasoned the Court had no 
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business deciding whether the institution of marriage should include 
same-sex couples because the “Constitution does not enact any one 
theory of marriage[;] [t]he people of a State are free to expand mar-
riage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic defini-
tion.”196 His dissent ended with “[i]f you are among the many Ameri-
cans . . . who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means cele-
brate today’s decision. . . . But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had 
nothing to do with it.”197 
 Thus, in less than three decades, the United States saw substantial 
changes in public opinion towards gay rights and same-sex marriage, 
with Supreme Court case outcomes paralleling that progress. This 
timeline is crucial in establishing the nexus between public opinion 
and judicial decisionmaking in this context. Part IV utilizes the atti-
tudinal model to establish this relationship and the attitudinal change 
model to provide an explanation for it.  
IV.   APPLYING A MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING TO THE SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE CASES 
 The gay rights and later same-sex marriage cases decided in the 
past three decades truly reflect monumental changes in societal opin-
ion about the issues. The timeline laid out in Part III demonstrates the 
coinciding progress made both by the American public and by the Su-
preme Court. Deciphering the relationship between public opinion and 
Supreme Court decisionmaking in this context is the next task ahead. 
While there is no single theory that provides an all-encompassing ex-
planation for judicial behavior, the attitudinal model, with contextual 
support by the attitudinal change model, is the best theory to do so.   
 It is worth noting that the same-sex marriage cases are unique and 
distinguishable from other cases when it comes to analyzing the rela-
tionship between the Court and public opinion. Controversies over gay 
rights and the legalization of same-sex marriage were and continue to 
be highly salient issues both in the eyes of the American public and 
before the Court. As of July 2015, two weeks after the Obergefell deci-
sion, fifty-eight percent of Americans supported the legalization of 
same-sex marriage but forty percent still opposed it; party lines and 
age clearly dividing the issue.198 Additionally, a fractured Supreme 
Court decided each of the cases analyzed in Part III, all being either a 
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6-3 or 5-4 decision. The three cases, Windsor, Hollingsworth, and 
Obergefell, that specifically addressed same-sex marriage were all de-
cided by a 5-4 margin.199 
 Another notable feature is that these cases were decided start-to-
finish in less than three decades, a relatively short period of time to 
witness a total transformation in the Court’s decisions. It only took the 
Court seventeen years to overturn its own decision in Bowers, finding 
that state laws banning same-sex sodomy were unconstitutional under 
the Due Process Clause. 200  Further, the three, and only, Supreme 
Court cases that directly analyzed same-sex marriage were decided in 
just two years. Therefore, my Part IV analysis is limited to the gay 
rights context, and perhaps it is applicable to other civil liberties cases 
that come before the Court. But it is not meant to apply to routine and 
non-salient Supreme Court decisions.  
A.   The Attitudinal Model “Plus” 
 Overall, the best model to fully explain the Court’s decisionmaking 
in the gay rights and same-sex marriage cases is the attitudinal model, 
with contextual support by the attitudinal change model. I term this 
combination the “attitudinal model ‘plus.’ ” The attitudinal model’s 
simple hypothesis that “[J]ustices come to the Supreme Court with 
their ideological preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual 
case facts these preferences cast overwhelming influence on their de-
cision making”201 proves true in the context of the same-sex marriage 
cases. Moreover, “as the Court moves in one ideological direction, it 
increases the likelihood that those who share the Court’s policy pref-
erences will be more likely to seek certiorari.”202 It necessarily follows 
that as the Court becomes more liberal, liberal litigants are more 
prone to pursue review.203 Thus, looking at the Court’s composition 
and voting alignment is the first step to determining whether the Jus-
tices voted ideologically.  
 In all six of the cases analyzed in Part III, a fractured Court issued 
the decisions either 6-3 or, more often, 5-4. A fractured Court is not 
always common and does not inevitably mean the Court was split ide-
ologically. In fact, over the past decade, 5-4 decisions made up an av-
erage of just twenty-two percent of the Court’s total opinions with an 
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average of sixty-seven percent of those 5-4 decisions split ideologi-
cally.204 However, when the Justices are ideologically liberal, as were 
the five majority members in Windsor and Obergefell, “[t]he odds are 
four times higher that the Court will issue a liberal decision.”205 Fur-
ther, when the case is politically salient, the odds that the Court issues 
a liberal decision are approximately twenty percent higher.206 
 Out of the three same-sex marriage cases decided by the Roberts 
Court, both Windsor and Obergefell had the same alignment of Jus-
tices. The five liberal Justices were as follows: Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the majority and the four conserva-
tive Justices: Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas dissenting. Out of the 
eighty-three 5-4 decisions made by the Roberts Court from the past 
five terms (October 2010 to June 2015), twenty-five of those decisions, 
including Obergefell and Windsor, were decided by that majority align-
ment.207 Thus, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan made up the majority in approximately thirty percent of 5-4 
decisions in the past five terms.  
 A more common alignment is Justice Kennedy with the conserva-
tive bloc—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, and 
Thomas—the majority in approximately forty-one percent of 5-4 deci-
sions in the past five terms. As the swing vote, “virtually every consti-
tutional question today turns on the vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
who is undoubtedly the most powerful [J]ustice in the history of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.”208 Thus, with almost any controversial issue be-
fore the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy’s vote is usually the deciding 
factor, proving that his preferences are of the utmost importance. The 
liberal majority alignment in Windsor and Obergefell is telling be-
cause those Justices, more often than not, are not the majority in split 
decisions, suggesting they voted ideologically here.  
 The decision in Hollingsworth is an anomaly. In that case, the 
Court decided petitioners did not have Article III standing to challenge 
California’s Proposition 8 and declined to decide whether the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited California from defining marriage as the 
union between one man and one woman.209 Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan voted in the majority; a 5-4 alignment 
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that has only happened once (in Hollingsworth) over the Court’s past 
five terms. Whether the individual Justices’ ideologies influenced their 
vote in Hollingsworth is unclear, but the Court as a whole did not split 
ideologically, making it the exception of the same-sex marriage cases.  
 Another factor that makes the attitudinal model convincing in this 
context is that Justice Kennedy authored four of the six cases dis-
cussed in Part III. The only two decisions he did not write were Bow-
ers, as he was not yet on the Court, and Hollingsworth, because he 
dissented. As previously mentioned, Justice Kennedy’s swing vote is 
very significant in controversial cases, generally making his prefer-
ences the ones that matter. His ideologies on gay rights are pretty 
clear. He authored all the Supreme Court’s decisions supporting gay 
rights, authored “an opinion that was remarkably gay-friendly for its  
time . . . [a]s a judge on the Ninth Circuit in 1980,” and comes from 
northern California, which is “overwhelmingly supportive of gay rights 
in general and gay marriage in particular.”210 Justice Kennedy is not 
only the swing vote on the Roberts Court but also holds a powerful 
position as one of the most senior Associate Justices.  
 One of the most important Supreme Court procedures is the process 
of majority opinion assignment. After hearing oral arguments on a 
case, the Court “holds a secret conference to discuss the case and cast 
tentative votes based upon any number of factors including their ideo-
logical predilection, argument advanced by direct and indirect parties, 
and logic underlying the solicitor general’s position on the case.”211 Af-
ter the vote, if the Chief Justice voted with the majority, he or she 
assigns the opinion.212 If not, the most senior Associate Justice in the 
majority assigns the opinion. 213  “[R]esearch suggests that [C]hief 
[J]ustices and other majority opinion assigners typically reserve cases 
high in salience for themselves.”214  
 In both Windsor and Obergefell, Justice Kennedy was the most sen-
ior Associate Justice that voted in the majority and accordingly, as-
signed both opinions to himself.215 This position gave him “substantial 
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agenda control over the content of the opinion” and did in fact “deter-
mine[] the future direction of law and policy” in regard to same-sex 
marriage.216 Consistent with the attitudinal model, self-assignment al-
lowed Justice Kennedy to write opinions that both directly reflected 
his own ideological preferences in light of the case facts while also 
keeping the majority coalition together.  
 The first inevitable limitation of the attitudinal model is that it as-
sumes ideological preferences are the primary determinant of the Jus-
tices’ behavior.217 This is an oversimplification of judicial decisionmak-
ing. The Justices’ ideological preferences and values may play a large 
role in some cases, like the same-sex marriage cases, but they certainly 
do not explain every case the Court decides. If that were true, every 
case would come out 5-4 or however the Court was ideologically split 
at the time. In reality, 5-4 decisions are not the norm and not always 
ideologically split. While the attitudinal model is not an accurate pred-
icator of every Supreme Court case, the Justices were ideologically 
split in every gay rights case dating back to Bowers, with the exception 
of Hollingsworth, strongly suggesting their political attitudes influ-
enced their votes. Thus, this limitation does not invalidate my analysis.  
 The second limitation of the attitudinal model is that it assumes Jus-
tices have fixed preferences when they are appointed and these prefer-
ences are enduring throughout their time on the bench.218 However, 
Justices are not immune from attitudinal changes, as former Supreme 
Court Justice Cardozo emphasized, “[t]he great tides and currents 
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass 
the judge by.”219 Further, this assumption fails to “address the link be-
tween constitutional design and social or political change” and does not 
explain short or long-term change in constitutional law.220 This is where 
the attitudinal change model comes in to provide an explanation.   
 The attitudinal change model suggests, “the observed direct linkage 
between public opinion and the behavior of [J]ustices arises from the 
force of mutually experienced events and ideas in shaping and reshap-
ing the preferences of both the public and the [J]ustices.”221 The link 
between public opinion and judicial decisionmaking is more indirect 
here because the changes in the Justices’ preferences parallel the 
                                                                                                                       
 216. Unah & Hancock, supra note 29, at 299.  
 217. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 39, at 171.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 167-78 (1921)). 
 220. Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1755 
(2003) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, REVISITED, supra note 14).  
 221. Giles et al., supra note 49, at 295.  
846  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:819 
   
changing preferences of the public.222 The attitudinal model did accu-
rately predict the outcomes of the same-sex marriage cases, but the 
attitudinal change model provides an explanation for how and why the 
Court progressed from Bowers to Obergefell in just three decades.  
 Changes in public preferences for same-sex marriage happened 
fairly drastically during this time. In 1996, only twenty-seven percent 
of Americans supported legalization of same-sex marriage, whereas 
sixty percent of Americans supported it in 2015.223 What could account 
for the changes in public attitudes regarding same-sex marriage? 
First, there have been large changes over the past decade in terms of 
favorable opinions of gay men and lesbians overall.224 In 2003, thirty-
seven percent of Americans reported viewing gay men favorably, while 
fifty-one percent viewed them unfavorably.225 Similarly, thirty-nine 
percent of Americans reported viewing lesbians favorably, while forty-
eight percent viewed them unfavorably. 226  However, by 2013, by a 
fifty-four percent to sixteen percent margin, more Americans had a fa-
vorable than unfavorable opinion of gay men, and by a fifty-eight per-
cent to nineteen percent margin, about twice as many Americans 
viewed lesbian women favorably than unfavorably.227  
 Additionally, the largest factor in the approval or disapproval of 
same-sex marriage is whether the individual knows someone who is 
gay or lesbian.228 When the Court decided Bowers in 1986, Justice 
Powell discussed the case with his gay law clerk and remarked that he 
had never known a gay person.229 At that time, only twenty-five per-
cent of Americans reported having a gay friend, coworker, or rela-
tive.230 By 1993, three years before the Court decided Romer, sixty-one 
percent of Americans polled as personally knowing someone that iden-
tified as gay or lesbian.231 Further, in 2013 when the Court decided 
Windsor and Hollingsworth, nearly nine out of ten Americans (eighty-
seven percent) personally knew someone who was gay or lesbian.232 
                                                                                                                       
 222. Id.  
 223. McCarthy, supra note 178.   
 224. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as 
‘ Inevitable,’ supra note 153.  
 225. Id.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Laura Dean, The Struggle for Legitimacy of Same-Sex Marriage and Public Opinion 
of Same-Sex Marriage (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Washington Univer-
sity), http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/897918260.html?FMT=ABS.   
 229. KLARMAN, supra note 9, at 37. 
 230. Klarman, supra note 10, at 132. 
 231. In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as 
‘ Inevitable,’ supra note 157.  
 232. Id.  
2017]  MARRIAGE EQUALITY 847 
   
   
The link between these relationships and attitudes about homosexu-
ality is strong. That same poll also revealed that roughly two-thirds 
(sixty-eight percent) of Americans who know a lot of people who are 
gay or lesbian favor gay marriage, compared to thirty-two percent of 
those who do not know anyone.233  
 Like the American public, Supreme Court Justices are also “social 
beings confronted with the plethora of stimuli emanating from Ameri-
can culture, media, and politics.”234 Over the past three decades, the 
Justices were simply not immune from these same social forces that 
lead the public to become more accepting of same-sex marriage. Before 
the Obergefell decision, Justice Ginsburg spoke at the University of 
Minnesota Law School and “marveled at the ‘remarkable’ shift in pub-
lic perception of same-sex marriage that she attribute[d] to gays and 
lesbians being more open about their relationships.”235 A few months 
later, she stated in an interview “I think that as more and more people 
came out and said that ‘this is who I am,’ the rest of us recognized that 
they are one of us.”236 Further, in 2014, Justice Kagan officiated a 
same-sex wedding for her former law clerk and his husband.237 Thus, 
from Justice Powell not even knowing a gay person (or knowing his 
law clerk was gay) in 1986, to Justice Ginsburg speaking out and Jus-
tice Kagan acting in support of same-sex marriage in 2014, the Court’s 
progress from Bowers to Obergefell goes beyond just the Justices’ ide-
ologies. Over time, the same social forces that swayed public opinion 
in favor of gay rights in general and eventually same-sex marriage 
equally influenced the Court as a whole.  
B.   Revisiting the Legal Model and Strategic Behavior Model 
 Although scholars have largely abandoned the legal model, which 
calls for impartial decisionmaking based on the merits, devoid of any 
expression of judicial individuality or ideology, it nonetheless finds little 
support in the context of the same-sex marriage cases. Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinions in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell exemplify 
the type of legal analysis that is filled with both judicial individuality 
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and ideology. His reasoning in those cases emphasized social policy, no-
tions of fairness, and dignity, as compared to strictly relying on the plain 
language of the Constitution. More significantly, Justice Kennedy used 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to broaden the 
scope of fundamental rights by embracing a vision of a living Constitu-
tion, which sharply conflicts with the legal model.  
 Specifically, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy “embraced an interpre-
tive methodology of living constitutionalism, which construes the 
open-ended language of the Constitution according to evolving social 
mores rather than the original understandings of its authors.”238 He 
echoed this sentiment in his two following opinions. In Windsor, he 
stated that recognizing the validity of same-sex marriages performed 
in the United States “reflects both the community’s considered per-
spective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its 
evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.”239 Two years later 
in Obergefell, he reasoned that the fundamental right to marry was an 
ancient tradition and arose in this context “from a better informed un-
derstanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty.”240 He 
went further to say that new societal understandings about our most 
fundamental institutions, specifically marriage, could reveal inequal-
ity that was once unnoticed and unchallenged.241  
 Praised by some and sharply condemned by others, Justice Ken-
nedy’s reasoning in these cases simply does not lead to case outcomes 
based purely on the legal merits and neutral principles that the legal 
model demands, nor should it. The most difficult and controversial 
cases come before the Supreme Court for a reason; they require that a 
complex multitude of factors be considered. Despite this, the legal 
model still portrays judges as scientifically applying the applicable 
rule of law, which leaves little room for discretionary authority and no 
room for judicial individuality. While the Court, and specifically Jus-
tice Kennedy, cited to precedent and constitutional provisions in the 
same-sex marriage cases, those explanations are not necessarily the 
reasons underlying the decision. Rather, judicial ideology and individ-
uality flourished in those cases, providing little to no support for the 
legal model in this context.   
 While slightly more persuasive than the legal model, the strategic 
behavior model also fails to find support in the same-sex marriage 
cases. This theory suggests “the Court directly and deliberately follows 
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public opinion for fear of losing its legitimacy as an institution.”242 Pub-
lic opinion serves as an active constraint on the Justices’ preferences 
here.243 The Justices do not underestimate the importance of public 
opinion in retaining the Court’s legitimacy and functionality as an in-
stitution. However, the strategic behavior model overemphasizes the 
effect this plays on judicial decisionmaking by suggesting the Court 
directly and deliberately follows public opinion for this reason.  
 In the gay rights and same-sex marriage cases, the progressiveness 
of public opinion and the Court’s decisions were never far off from each 
other. The timelines arguably coincided because of mutually shared 
experiences and ideas that shaped and reshaped the public and the 
Court’s opinions. However, there was no direct causal relationship ei-
ther way. When the Court decided Lawrence in 2003, it was inevitably 
moving towards the question of legalizing same-sex marriage, yet only 
thirty-two percent of the public favored legalizing same-sex marriage 
with fifty-nine percent opposing it.244 Even when the Court decided 
Windsor and Hollingsworth in 2013, public approval of legalizing 
same-sex marriage was hovering right above fifty percent.245 Further, 
all of the Court’s gay rights decisions leading up to Obergefell sug-
gested same-sex marriage legalization would be the outcome. The 
Court decided Obergefell based on its own principles set forth in Wind-
sor and the strong influence of ideological preferences, not because it 
feared losing its institutional legitimacy.  
V.   CONCLUSION  
 As one of the most socially, politically, and legally contentious is-
sues in the United States, the progressive changes in public opinion 
and Supreme Court decisionmaking regarding same-sex marriage in 
recent years is truly remarkable. It reflects broader concepts about de-
mocracy, the judiciary, and the Constitution. As explained by Justice 
Frankfurter, “[i]n our scheme of government, readjustment to great 
social changes means juristic readjustment. . . . [a]nd so American con-
stitutional law is not a fixed body of truth but a mode of social adjust-
ment.”246 Consistent with the attitudinal model, the Justices’ ideologi-
cal preferences cast an overwhelming influence on their decisionmak-
ing in the same-sex marriage cases. Further, over the last three dec-
ades, the same social forces that swayed public opinion to gradually 
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accept and support the legal recognition of same-sex marriage equally 
swayed the Supreme Court (or at least the majority). The attitudinal 
change model completes the explanation for how and why the Court 
progressed from its Bowers decision to the monumental Obergefell de-
cision. Thus, I can conclude in this context that the main influence on 
the Justices’ vote choice was ideological preferences, but over time and 
in the aggregate, the Court indirectly responded to the shifting tides 
of public opinion.  
 
